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1 Introduction
Over the past twenty years, housing prices in China have risen rapidly. From 2003 to
2007, the rates of price increase reached as high as 14 percent per year, on average. Some
cities, such as Beijing, reported an annual increase of 22 percent. If we include rental
income and capital income, then the return on housing capital exceeds that for business
sectors,1 which raises grave concerns regarding the possible existence of price bubbles.
This is a major concern for policymakers in China as a bubble burst would have serious
consequences for China’s economy. Thus, it is important to determine whether housing
price bubbles actually exist in China.
Most related literature tests for house price bubbles by comparing the present value
of houses with housing market prices. The main debate in the literature concerns how
to calculate present value. A popular method is to discount future cash flows (rental
income), but this approach is not reliable. Future rental income in China is difficult to
predict because rental income is affected by economic variables such as GDP, population
density, etc., that continue to change over time. Furthermore, it is difficult to choose an
appropriate discount rate for housing assets.
Some researchers consider that house price increases should be explained by changes in
economic fundamentals, such as income, construction costs, population and interest rates.
House price bubbles are defined as deviations from those fundamentals. For example,
Mikhed and Zemcik (2009) suggest that the oversized house price increases in the US
between 1997 and 2006 cannot be explained by changes in these fundamentals. This is in
contrast with McCarthy and Peach (2004) who at the time of their publication, found no
bubble in the US housing market and that changes in house prices reflected movements
1Xin et al. (2007) estimate the average return rate of the listed companies in Chinese stock markets.
They show that the average return rate is around 2.6 percent. CCER (2007) show that capital returns
in China have been increasing since 1998. The capital return of state-owned companies between 2003 to
2006 is 8 percent, on average, while the capital return of the private sector is 17 percent for the same
period. Because private companies are financially constrained, the high return can be explained by the
insufficiency of their capital. The literature, such as Cagetti and Nardi (2006), has shown that when
financially constrained, companies have higher capital returns in equilibrium.
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in the fundamentals, such as income and interest rates.2 However, this approach depends
heavily on the choice of economic fundamentals with the results being quite sensitive to
the perspective from which these fundamentals are considered.
As for the housing market in China, many researchers set up demand and supply
functions for housing and use the equilibrium conditions of efficient markets to test for
house price bubbles, but their definitions of a bubble are vague. Moreover, Montrucchio
and Privileggi (2001) and Santos and Woodford (1997), among others, have already proved
that rational expectation bubbles are marginal and fragile in the general equilibrium
of efficient markets. Hence, solid theoretical support does not exist for applying the
equilibrium model of efficient markets to this area.
In this paper, we provide a new method to test for the existence of rational expectation
bubbles in China’s housing market. The bubbles we test were first proposed by Blanchard
and Watson (1983). We call this kind of bubble a rational expectation growing bubble
(hereafter growing bubbles) because they grow until they burst and then commence grow-
ing again. These bubbles grow because their returns must be comparative to the average
returns of other assets. Growing bubbles are characterized by asset prices that continue
to grow over time and returns that surpass the average capital return in the economy.
These features match the dynamic path of China’s house prices quite well over the past
ten years.
There are two important assumptions in the classical model of growing bubbles we test:
representative agents and complete financial markets. In the literature, other theories of
rational bubbles are examined by relaxing these assumptions. For example, Burnside et
al. (2011) derive the boom-bust cycle of house price bubbles based on the assumption of
heterogeneous beliefs. When people hold different beliefs about future returns, they make
different evaluations about the fundamentals of assets. Through the social interactions
of rational agents, house prices may experience the dynamic process of rises and falls in
2This literature also includes Shiller (1990), Clapp and Giaccotto (1994), Abraham and Hendershott
(1996), Capozza et al. (2002), Case and Shiller (2003) and Gallin (2006).
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the equilibrium. In addition, Kiyotaki and Moore (2004) explore how bubbles function in
incomplete financial markets. In these markets, firms have borrowing constraints against
their future flow of profits and liquidity constraints against their capital holdings. Hence
they choose to save in the forms of liquid assets in order to fund possible future demand for
investment. Recent literature, such as Kocherlakota (2009) and Wang and Wen (2009),
concludes that in incomplete financial markets, bubbles can exist as a form of liquid asset
at one of the equilibria. Although the literature covers many theoretical models on asset
price bubbles, our work only focuses on the growing bubbles as defined in Blanchard and
Watson (1983). We shed some light on whether the modeling of bubbles in the classical
theories can explain China’s housing market.
Unlike most literature studying China’s housing market, such as Dreger and Zhang
(2010), Han (2010) and Wang et al. (2011), this paper tests for the existence of growing
bubbles by adopting the method in McQueen and Thorley (1994), which was originally
proposed to find stock market bubbles. Because the theory of rational expectation bubbles
proposed by Blanchard and Watson (1983) can be applied to any risky asset and McQueen
and Thorley (1994) derive their method based on this theory, their method can also be
applied to house prices. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to apply this
method to the housing market. However, their method cannot be implemented directly.
In the empirical analysis, we find that annual data only exists for eleven years, which
is too short to conduct the same application of time series as in McQueen and Thorley
(1994). This limitation also makes it difficult to apply any method dealing with time
series such as cointegration or unit root tests, as applied in Mikhed and Zemcik (2009).
We circumvent this problem by extending their method into the panel data analysis for
metropolitan areas since house returns in those areas are highly correlated.3 This bypasses
arbitrary estimation of fundamental house values and does not require theoretical support
3We conduct the cross-section correlation test with the null hypothesis that all house returns are
uncorrelated against the alternative that the correlation is nonzero for some of them. We use the statistic
in Frees (1995) and find that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1 percent significance level.
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for bubbles in the equilibrium of efficient markets. The basis of our methodology is that
the existence of growing bubbles implies that negative returns on house prices are less
likely to occur. However, based on data from thirty-five cities in China, we find that the
hazard rate of positive returns is not a decreasing function of duration. This suggests
that there are no growing bubbles in the housing market of China.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the model
used to test for house price bubbles. In Section 3, we illustrate the empirical results, and
Section 4 provides our conclusion.
2 Model
2.1 Theoretical Model
Blanchard and Watson (1983) propose a definition of rational expectation bubbles based
on a simple efficient market condition, which states that the expected return of a house
purchase is equal to the required return:
Et[Rt+1] = rt.
Here Et denotes the expectation conditional on the information set at time t. We denote
rt as the required return on this asset at period t. The return of owning a house from
period t to period t+1 is Rt+1 satisfying
Rt+1 ≡
p∗t+1 − p∗t + dt+1
p∗t
.
Here p∗t and p
∗
t+1 are the unobservable true values of housing at periods t and t+1. We say
dt+1 is the rental income of the house at period t+ 1. By holding a house from period t to
period t+ 1, the investor has two sources of revenue: the capital gain from the variation
in house prices and the rental income. After some rearrangement, the condition for a
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We assume market house prices, pt, contain two components: the true value and the
bubble, as shown by pt = p
∗
t + bt. Here bt is denoted as the bubble. As long as bt satisfies
Et[bt+1] = (1 + rt)bt, (3)
Condition (1) will hold for the market price. This suggests that market price can deviate
from the fundamental value by a rational speculative bubble factor, bt. Equation (3) is
the necessary condition for bubbles to exist in the competitive equilibrium. It implies
that as long as bt grows over time and provides the required return of rt, the agents in
the economy would like to hold houses with price bubbles.
Following McQueen and Thorley (1994), we use εt+1 to define the unexpected price
changes of the house. Since pt+1 = p
∗
t+1 + bt+1, both the unexpected changes in the
true value and the unexpected changes in bt+1 can affect εt+1. We can write εt+1 =
µt+1 + ηt+1, where µt+1 and ηt+1 are the unexpected changes for the true value and the
bubble, respectively. The unexpected change in the true value is defined by
µt+1 = p
∗
t+1 + dt+1 − (1 + rt)p∗t .
We also define the unexpected change in the bubble as
ηt+1 = bt+1 − (1 + rt)bt.
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We assume that µt+1 satisfies a symmetric distribution with mean 0. We assume symmetry
because the true value is believed to have the mean-reversion property. In addition, we
assume that bt follows a two-point discrete distribution. The bubble component of bt,
with probability π, persists in the house price for the following period. Alternatively, bt
bursts with a probability of 1 − π with the remainder designated as a0. In order for the







a0 with probability π
a0 with probability 1− π
. (4)
Here, we assume π > 1−π, which implies π > 1/2. This is reasonable because, empirically,
the probability for a bubble to burst is smaller than for it to persist, no matter what the
underlying asset is. We can observe this from stock markets and housing markets around





a0 > a0 ≥ 0. (5)
This means if the bubble persists, its realized value is larger than its value when it bursts.






[(1 + rt)bt − a0] with probability π
µt+1 − (1 + rt)bt + a0 with probability 1-π.
(6)
Equation (6) shows that if the bubble component persists from period t to period t +
1, the expected abnormal return is (1−π)
π
[(1 + rt+1)bt − a0] and hence positive. If the
bubble component bursts, the expected abnormal return is −(1 + rt+1)bt + a0 which must
be negative because the efficient market condition requires that the expected value of
abnormal return is zero. As the possibility of bubbles persisting is higher than that of
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bursting, the probability of observing negative abnormal returns will be smaller than 1/2
and decrease with bt if the bubbles exist. On the contrary, if the price does not contain
bubbles, the probability of observing negative abnormal returns should be equal to 1/2.
So when we observe a sequence of positive abnormal returns, with large probability this
means that the bubble component persists and accumulates over time.
We define the probability of observing the negative abnormal return as
λt+1 ≡ Prob[εt+1 < 0],





((1 + rt)bt − a0)
]
+ (1− π)F [(1 + rt)bt − a0] .
Here F (·) is the cumulative density function of unexpected changes in the fundamental
value µt+1. Let us look at the first-order partial derivative of λt+1 with respect to bt,
∂λt+1
∂bt




((1 + rt)bt − a0))− f((1 + rt)bt − a0)
]
.
Since π > 1/2 and f is symmetric around 0, ∂λt+1
∂bt
< 0. So the probability of observing
negative unexpected price changes will fall as the bubble grows. As stated by McQueen
and Thorley (1994), when the bubble component grows, it exerts more dominance over
fundamental values. Negative unexpected price changes are less likely to happen and
happen primarily when the bubbles burst.











The theoretical model demonstrates that the bubble component leads to a smaller prob-
ability of observing negative abnormal return rates of assets as it persists, grows and
continuously bears positive abnormal return rates. Therefore, we have the necessary con-
dition for the existence of bubbles: the probability of negative abnormal return rates
decreases with the number of periods where the positive rates of abnormal returns are
observed. If we use h(T ) to denote the hazard rate of positive abnormal return rates and
T to denote the number of periods of positive abnormal return rates (or run length), then




where h(T ) = Prob(et < 0|et−1 > 0, et−2 > 0, · · · , et−T > 0, et−T−1 < 0).
2.2 Model Implementation
McQueen and Thorley (1994) apply Equation (7) to test for bubbles in the US stock
market. They use the monthly returns of portfolios (equally weighted or value-weighted)
of all New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stocks from 1927 to 1991. They compute the
time series of unexpected returns and hence, the hazard rates, h(T ), under the assumption
that an abnormal return is independent and identically distributed (i.e., i.i.d.) over time.
Then, they test whether or not h(T ) satisfies Equation (7).
However, this method cannot work in the housing market of China. China started the
marketization of residential real estate in the middle of the 1990s, and therefore, there
are no more than 15 data points in the time series of house prices and rental income at
annual frequency. Small samples generate large errors when computing hazard rates. So,
to alleviate this problem, we use the panel data of thirty-five cities.
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where pit denotes the price in city i at time t and d
i
t denotes the rental income. We
then compute the rate of unexpected returns where unexpected return is the difference
between the actual return and the expected return. Hence, if we denote eit as the rate of






t) denotes the expected house return rates at time t by using the informa-
tion available to time t − 1. We run a predictive regression to obtain this value. Some
idiosyncratic factors that are not time-varying may exist due to the information coming
from different cities. Therefore, we employ a fixed-effect model to forecast house returns,








where fi is unobservable city characteristics and x
i
j,t−1 is the j-th factor in the i-th city
at time t− 1. The residual of the regression, eit, is treated as the unexpected return rates.
As for the explanatory variables {xij,t−1}, we may choose them as follows. House
returns consist of two components: rental income, dit, and capital income from house price
variations, pit−pit−1. Thus, we focus on the variations in these two components to forecast
returns. We add the lagged rent-price ratio, rpit−1, into the list of explanatory variables
to capture the effects of expected rental income on expected house returns. Gallin (2006)
suggests that house price variations, pit−pit−1, reflect changes in the fundamentals, such as
personal income, population, construction costs, usage costs of housing and interest rates.




capture the effects of expected income growth and population growth on expected house
price changes. Moreover, the rates of expected returns should also reflect the changes
of the social average (or required) discounted rates for future cash flows. The rates of
expected returns fluctuate with business cycles: low in peaks and high in troughs. Fama
and French (1989), among others, analyze the effects of macroeconomic variables on the
rates of stock returns and find that unemployment rates predict higher future rates of
stock returns. Their explanation is that, in economic recessions, people require higher
expected return rates for assets to compensate for the risks brought by macroeconomic
uncertainty. Here, following Fama and French (1989), we regard the unemployment rate,
unemit−1, as a measurement for macroeconomic conditions. As an explanatory variable of
the regression, it reveals how macroeconomic risks affect expected returns in the housing
market. In addition to these fundamental factors, we also include variables implying the
opportunity cost of holding houses. An increase in opportunity cost should lead to a
decrease in house prices and generate lower expected returns. The rate rrit−1 denotes
interest rates of one-year bank deposits. The rate srit−1 denotes the rates of returns from
China’s stock market. The former provides the return rates of risk-free assets while the
latter provides the return rates of risky and less liquid assets.
After we obtain the rates of unexpected (or abnormal) returns, we count the run
lengths of positive rates of abnormal returns of the thirty-five cities and combine them
together to estimate the hazard rate.4 We assume that the hazard rate takes a linear-
logistic function as




4We need an assumption that the abnormal return is i.i.d. across time and cities here. Although it
is hard to justify this assumption because of the short time series, we circumvent potential pitfalls of
this assumption by studying different model settings. This is reasonable because the lack of i.i.d. can be
explained as ‘indicating that there is still something there.’ For example, cross-sectional dependence in
the residuals implies that the model may not include some common factors, so we add more factors to
the model. If there is a serial correlation, then adding a lagged dependent variable into the right-hand
side of the regression is the usual treatment. This approach is not uncommon (see Willcocks (2009) and
Al-Loughani and Chappell (1997), for example.). Since model specification is not the main goal of this
paper, we simply study all the potential models with different sets of regressors.
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Nt lnht +Mt ln(1− ht) +Qt ln(1− ht), (10)
where Nt is the count of completed runs of length t in the sample, and Mt and Qt are the
count of completed and partial runs of length greater than t. The necessary condition for




implying that β should be negative.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data
We focus on yearly house returns between 1999 and 2009. Appendix A presents all the
data used in this paper from thirty-five cities. Figure 1 gives the names and the locations
of the thirty-five cities. All of the cities but one are located in the east and central areas
of China. This is consistent with the population distribution: around 70 percent of the
population is concentrated in these areas, which represents only 30 percent of China’s land
area.5 Figures 2 and 3 display the nominal GDP and house prices averaged across all the
thirty-five cities. These two figures show that from 1999 to 2009, nominal GDP increased
to more than 400 percent and nominal house prices increased to around 300 percent.
As local goods, houses are difficult to trade across different locations. The changes in
house prices therefore reflect variations in local fundamental factors and opportunity
costs. Hence, we use the CPI of each city instead of national CPI to transform all nominal
variables into real variables,6 including rates of stock returns and one-year deposit rates.
5Resources: National Bureau of Statistics of China.
6We also use the GDP deflator to convert nominal values into real values. The results are shown in
Section 3.3.
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The transformed data, which we use in our empirical analysis, are summarized in Table
1. By following Breitung (2000), we perform the unit-root test for these variables, one
by one, and reject the unit-root hypothesis at the 10 percent significance level for each of
them.
[Figure 1 around here]
[Figure 2 around here]
[Figure 3 around here]
[Table 1 around here]
3.2 Empirical Results
We first analyze the benchmark model specified by Equation (8). In this experiment, we
study four different sets of regressors.
Table 2 displays the empirical results of the benchmark models. In the first panel,
the first column lists all the variables and the other four columns display the regressors
for each model studied. For each variable, the first row indicates the estimators for its
coefficients and the second row has its p−value.
[Table 2 around here]
The estimation results are very interesting. First, the coefficient for the rent-price
ratio, rp, is positive and significant at the 10 percent level (thereafter, the significance
level is set at 10 percent). The high value of the rent-price ratio implies that cash flow
from owning a house is high. Thus, investors are more likely to increase their investment
in houses, so house prices will increase in the future, which leads to an increase in capital
income from future price changes. Therefore, as expected, our results suggest that the
lagged rental-price ratio is positively related to the rate of future house returns.
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Second, the coefficient for the growth rate of GDP per capita is only significant in
Model I and Model II. Other fundamental factors including population growth rate and
unemployment rate are not significant in any model. Regional development in China is
unbalanced. The differences in real GDP growth rate (per capita) reflects the differences
in the income growth of each city. The unemployment rate reflects macroeconomic risks
due to the business cycle and is high when the local economy is in recession; the population
growth rate reflects the increase of local consumption demand for houses. However, the
empirical results show that these variables do not significantly affect the expected returns
on housing assets. One possible explanation is that housing capital can flow freely across
the different cities of China so as to completely eliminate the influence of local economic
fundamentals.
Third, the coefficients for real deposit rates and real stock returns are significant and






j=0(1 + rft+j + dft+j)
, (12)
where rft+j is the risk-free rate, and dft+j is the interest rate compensating the risks of
liquidity and price variations. The sum of rft+j and dft+j is equal to rt+j in Equation
(2). Equation (12) shows that house prices decrease with an increase of rf or df . Real
deposit rates, rr, are the benchmark for risk-free rates, rf . When real deposit rates
suddenly increase, house prices will decrease. A decrease in house prices will reduce house
transactions, and hence increase liquidity risk and df .7 In addition, the difference between
rates of real stock returns and real risk-free rates gives the price of risks. An increase in
stock returns over risk-free rates shows that the market requires higher compensation for
7Liquidity risk is the risk that a given asset cannot be traded quickly enough in the market to prevent
a loss (or to make the required profit). A large literature, both empirical and theoretical, has shown
that house transactions and price increases are significantly positively correlated. This literature includes
Stein (1995) and Genesove and Mayer (2001), among others. When house transactions increase, the time
spent on liquidizing house assets decreases and so does the risk brought by variations in house prices.
Hence liquidity risks are smaller when house transactions boom.
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risks. This implies that the market is more risk averse as it then puts a higher value for
df . Hence the increase of these two variables leads to a future decrease of house prices
and a decrease in rates of expected house returns.
Our results reveal that Chinese houses are mainly used as investment goods instead
of consumption goods, so the opportunity cost of capital becomes the major influencing
power. This phenomenon may be explained by the institutional features of Chinese finan-
cial markets. China is still in a period of transition; in particular, the nominal deposit
rates of Chinese commercial banks have not been liberalized. As they are capped by the
government, nominal deposit rates in China adjust very slowly.8 This leads to negative
real deposit rates when volatile inflation is high. As Figure 4 shows, China spent around
half of the decade between 2000 to 2011 with negative real deposit rates. This experience
reinforces the misconception that negative real deposit rates are persistent. Equation (12)
tells us that house prices increase with a decrease in real deposit rates. The extreme case
is that house prices may converge to infinity if rft+j remains negative and dft+j is close
to zero, as long as rental income, dt, does not also converge to zero. Hence, after such a
long period of negative real deposit rates, house prices in China are expected to be high.
[Figure 4 around here]
The popular indicators used to measure house price bubbles, including rental/price
and income/price ratios, cannot apply to our case because those comparative numbers are
derived from developed countries where real risk-free rates are mostly positive. Similarly,
Himmelberg et al. (2005) agreed when long-term real interest rates are low, house prices
are sensitive to changes in fundamentals; hence these fundamentals cannot be used to
determine the existence of bubbles. Lacking safe channels for investment, Chinese people
hold houses to protect their wealth from losses due to inflation. For houses, the role of
8Many papers describe and analyze this special feature of Chinese financial markets including Wang
(2001) and Burdekin and Siklos (2008), among others. Therefore, our paper will not repeat the discussions
related to this point.
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investment therefore dominates that of consumption in China as shown by our empirical
results.
The first panel of Table 2 gives us the estimation results. Based on these estimated
parameters, we collect the residuals of the regressions, counting the numbers of partial
and completed run lengths on thirty-five cities individually. Then we apply MLE to get
the estimators for α and β in Equation (9) and Equation (10). The second panel of
Table 2 reports the results of this MLE estimation. Figure 5 displays the estimators of
the hazard rates with their 90 percent confidence intervals. The confidence intervals are
based on the likelihood ratio test, which ensures that they conform to the zero to one
probability space and allows them to be asymmetric.
We see that the estimator for β is positive in all the models. This means the hazard rate
increases with duration. In addition, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that β = 0 in
any of the four models, so the hazard rate at least does not depend on duration. Neither
of these results satisfies the necessary condition for the existence of growing bubbles.
Therefore, we conclude that there are no growing bubbles in China’s housing market.
[Figure 5 around here]
3.3 Robustness Check
In order to check the robustness of our results, we consider different models and regres-
sions.
3.3.1 Subsamples
We use the subsample of the data of all the cities between 2003 and 2007 to analyze the
benchmark models described in the previous section. House prices grew most rapidly be-
tween 2003 and 2007. Higher growth rates of house prices are supposed to generate higher
abnormal returns. Hence this is a period with a high probability of rational expectation
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growing bubbles. We test this subsample to verify the robustness of our results. The
estimation results are summarized in Table 3.
[Table 3 around here]
By comparing the coefficients of the regressions with the whole sample, we can see the
following differences. The rent-price ratio, rp, is not significant in the subsample. This
implies a further deviation of house returns from the economic fundamentals. Second,
the coefficient of real risk-free rates is around five times higher in the subsample than for
that of the whole sample. Hence predicted house return rates are much more sensitive to
real risk-free rates in the subsample. These two points imply that the role of investment
in the housing market gets stronger but the role of consumption gets weaker. Finally, the
coefficient of stock return is still significant but changes its sign completely, which implies
a structural difference between the subsample and the whole sample. However, we can
see that the p−values of estimated β are all higher than 10 percent which suggests that
the hazard function is not dependent on duration. Hence there is no evidence supporting
the existence of growing bubbles in this subperiod.
Now we move back to the whole sample between 1999 and 2009, but divide them into
two groups based on the average levels of the cities’ GDP per capita, and make separate
empirical analyses. GDP per capita varies greatly across the provinces of China. In
the previous analysis, we did not control for this variable because of its nonstationarity.
Here, we sort the thirty-five cities based on their average GDP per capita from 1999 to
2009 and select the leading 18 cities as the high-GDP city group with the remaining 17
cities as the low-GDP city group. Appendix B displays the names of the cities in each
group. Most high-GDP cites are located in coastal areas while low-GDP cities are located
in the interior. Table 4 and Table 5 summarize the empirical results. An interesting
difference is that the growth rate of GDP per capita is significant and positive for the
high-GDP cities in all of the models, but not significant for the low-GDP cities in any
of the models. This indicates that expected house returns depend on the growth of the
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local economy in the rich regions but not in the poor regions. One possible explanation
is that the majority of housing assets in the poor regions may be held by people from
the rich regions. Furthermore, the second panels of Table 4 and Table 5 show that in all
the models for each group, the estimators of β are positive and the hypothesis of β = 0
cannot be rejected. Hence, we are yet to find any evidence to support decreasing hazard
rates for each group, implying that there are no rational expectation growing bubbles in
the housing market of China (after controlling for the effect of GDP per capita).
[Table 4 around here]
[Table 5 around here]
3.3.2 Dynamic Model
Following McQueen and Thorley (1994), we include lagged rates of house returns as
explanatory variables in the model and apply the dynamic panel estimation method,
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), to obtain residuals. The regression model is










Table 6 displays the results of the regressions. We see that, in all models, the estimated
coefficient for the lagged rates of house returns is negative. This implies that as a form
of asset, houses are mean-reverting in returns, as are other ordinary assets like stocks.9
The second panel of Table 6 shows that the estimators of β are insignificant. Therefore
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that β = 0. The existence of growing bubbles is not
supported in this scenario.
[Table 6 around here]
9See Fama (1970) and Samuelson (1991).
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3.3.3 Different Measures of Variables
We now consider the potential consequences different measures have on some of the vari-
ables. First, we use nominal variables rather than real variables, to replicate the bench-
mark analyses. Table 7 summarizes the results.
[Table 7 around here]
Then, we return to the real values of our sample, but we use the GDP deflator instead
of CPI to obtain these real values. Table 8 shows the estimating results.
[Table 8 around here]
We see that the patterns of the hazard functions in these two settings are very similar
to those of the original benchmark models. And again, the existence of growing bubbles
is not supported even when different measures are used on the variables.
3.3.4 Hazard Rate Functions
All the previous analyses are based on the linear-logistic function of the hazard rate. We
try a simple linear function where
h(t) = α + βt. (14)
We then apply this hazard function to the benchmark models and compare the estimation
results with the original results. Table 9 shows this comparison.
[Table 9 around here]
We find that estimated β is not significant in any of the four models, no matter which
hazard function is used. This implies that, for some scenarios, it is difficult to credit the
existence of growing bubbles.
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In summary, there is no scenario with the necessary condition for growing bubbles to
exist, i.e., that the hazard rate decreases with the durations of observed positive rates of
abnormal returns. This is in spite of our adjustments to both the models and the data.
This implies that our result is robust and that the data do not support the existence of
growing bubbles in the housing market of China.
4 Conclusion
This paper tests for the existence of rational expectation growing bubbles in China’s
housing market. We find that house returns in Chinese cities do not satisfy the necessary
condition for the existence of such bubbles. We also demonstrate that our result is robust.
This means that attributing the rapid growth of China’s house prices to the growing
bubbles is inappropriate. In other words, it is misleading to ascribe high house prices to
opportunistic purchases aimed at future capital gains brought by the expanding bubble
components.
In addition, we also find two interesting results. First, local fundamentals such as the
GDP growth rate, unemployment and population growth, cannot significantly affect the
local expected returns of houses. As we have discussed previously, house capital flows
freely across different regions, and hence eliminates any influence of the local economy
on the expected rate of house returns. Cash flow from rich regions becomes the major
reason for the high rate of increase in house prices in poor regions. Given the recent rapid
rise in house prices, the government is now confronted with pressure to lower the rate of
increase of house prices in certain cities and make house prices consistent with income
growth. Thus, our result implies that to achieve this, it is necessary to block the free flow
of capital between the housing markets of different cities, especially from rich to poor
regions. Then you will see expected house returns varying with the local growth rate of
income. Policies such as placing restraints on the purchases of houses by non-locals can
work in this direction.
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Second, real deposit rates significantly negatively affect expected house returns. As
the opportunity cost of capital, this variable influences the expectation of house returns
mainly through its affect on the expectations of future house prices. It also highlights that,
in China’s housing market, the role of investment dominates that of consumption. The
long-term official control of nominal deposit rates may be responsible for this phenomenon.
Therefore, any policy targeting the elimination of investment demand for Chinese houses
should significantly affect the prices of Chinese houses. Also bear in mind that the dis-
tortion of China’s financial market contributes to this phenomenon, so any future reform
or liberalization of the financial market may render the current high prices of Chinese
houses unsustainable.
To explore the mechanisms behind the rapid increase of house prices any further, we
need to carefully examine demand and supply in China’s housing market. China continues
to experience extraordinary changes in both income growth and urbanization. We also
know that the government is the dominant power in terms of land supply in China. Do
these special features of the housing market affect the dynamics of China’s house prices?
These questions are left for future research.
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This section describes the data in this paper. All the data, unless specified, are collected
from CEIC Data (available at http://www.ceicdata.com).
1. House price (hp): average market price of newly built houses within one city.
2. Rental price (hr): we can only obtain a rental index, which is an index regarding
the nominal rental price of the previous year as 100. We back out the rental price
from this index by assuming that the ratio of rental price over housing price in 1997
is equal to the nominal deposit rate at that time.
3. Nominal aggregate gross domestic product (ngdp).
4. Unemployed population (upop): the population of registered unemployed people.
5. Working population (wpop): the population of registered working people includ-
ing both industry and government of the corresponding city. [Source: China City
Statistical Yearbook].
6. Self-employed population (spop): the population of registered self-employed popu-
lation. [Source: China City Statistical Yearbook].
7. Consumer Price Index (cpi): the price level in 1997 is the base year.
8. Aggregate population (apop): the population of permanent residents (Hukou hold-
ers) within one city including rural areas.
9. Nominal stock return (nsr): the value-weighted returns for the Shanghai and Shen-
zhen stock exchanges.
10. Nominal deposit rate (dr): one-year deposit rate of China’s commercial banks.
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11. Real house return: Rt =
(hpt+hrt)cpit−1
hpt−1cpit
− 1. Real house return includes the summa-
tions of rental income and capital income from price changes, adjusted by inflation.

























High-GDP Cities: Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, Hangzhou, Guangzhou, Nanjing, Fuzhou,
Shenyang, Jinan, Urumqi, Dalian, Qingdao, Ningbo, Xiamen, Shenzhen, Hohhot, Wuhan,
and Haikou.
Low-GDP Cities: Xining, Chongqing, Nanning, Guiyang, Hefei, Yinchuan, Xi’an,




Table 1: Data used in Regression
Item Variables Notation Year
1 House return R 1999-2009
2 Rent-price ratio rp 1998-2008
3 Growth rate of GDP per capita gdp 1998-2008
4 Real deposit rate rr 1998-2008
5 Real stock return sr 1998-2008
6 Population growth rate pop 1998-2008
7 Unemployment rate unem 1998-2008
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Table 2: Benchmark Models
Regressors Model I Model II Model III Model IV
rp 1.46 1.51 1.52 1.52
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
gdp 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.16
0.05 0.03 0.13 0.14
rr -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01






cons 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05
0.00 0.03 0.07 0.07
linear-logistic hazard function ht = 1/(1 + exp(−α− βt))
α -0.55 -0.45 -0.51 -0.48
β 0.25 0.23 0.26 0.25
likelihood ratio test H0 : β = 0
p−value 0.14 0.17 0.13 0.14
This is a summary of the estimation results for four different models. The notations follow Table
1. For each regressor, the first row reports the estimator of the corresponding coefficient, and
the second row is its associated p−value. The estimators of the hazard functions are derived
based on the run length of the residuals of the regressions.
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Table 3: Benchmark Models for Subsample: 2003-2007
Regressors Model I Model II Model III Model IV
rp -0.96 0.60 0.61 0.73
0.41 0.66 0.65 0.62
gdp 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.06
0.70 0.45 0.62 0.64
rr -0.02 -0.05 -0.51 -0.05
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00






cons 0.23 0.20 0.20 0.22
0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00
linear-logistic hazard function ht = 1/(1 + exp(−α− βt))
α -0.32 -0.56 -0.68 -1.02
β -0.04 0.19 0.31 0.51
likelihood ratio test H0 : β = 0
p−value 0.95 0.75 0.60 0.33
This is a summary of the estimation results for the subsample between 2003 and 2007. The
notations follow Table 1. For each regressor, the first row reports the estimator of the corre-
sponding coefficient, and the second row is its associated p−value. The estimators of the hazard
functions are derived based on the run length of the residuals of the regressions.
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Table 4: Benchmark Models for High-GDP Cities
Regressors Model I Model II Model III Model IV
rp 1.02 1.07 1.10 1.07
0.09 0.10 0.08 0.09
gdp 0.24 0.26 0.32 0.33
0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05
rr -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
0.00 0.02 0.03 0.03






cons 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.05
0.00 0.05 0.14 0.18
linear-logistic hazard function ht = 1/(1 + exp(−α− βt))
α -0.71 -0.61 -0.49 -0.49
β 0.40 0.29 0.24 0.24
likelihood ratio test H0 : β = 0
p−value 0.15 0.22 0.31 0.31
This is a summary of the estimation results for high-GDP cities. The notations follow Table 1.
For each regressor, the first row reports the estimator of the corresponding coefficient, and the
second row is its associated p−value. The estimators of the hazard functions are derived based
on the run length of the residuals of the regressions.
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Table 5: Benchmark Models for Low-GDP Cities
Regressors Model I Model II Model III Model IV
rp 2.69 2.77 2.79 2.74
0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
gdp 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07
0.43 0.36 0.49 0.55
rr -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
0.00 0.15 0.16 0.16






cons 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03
0.92 0.68 0.64 0.52
linear-logistic hazard function ht = 1/(1 + exp(−α− βt))
α -0.05 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17
β 0.17 0.21 0.21 0.21
likelihood ratio test H0 : β = 0
p−value 0.54 0.43 0.43 0.43
This is a summary of the estimation results for low-GDP cities. The notations follow Table 1.
For each regressor, the first row reports the estimator of the corresponding coefficient, and the
second row is its associated p−value. The estimators of the hazard functions are derived based
on the run length of the residuals of the regressions.
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Table 6: Dynamic Models
Regressors Model I Model II Model III Model IV
R−1 -0.14 −0.08 −0.09 −0.10
0.08 0.50 0.37 0.29
rp 3.88 4.17 3.86 3.76
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
gdp 0.18 0.22 0.25 0.26
0.07 0.02 0.07 0.06
rr -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
0.00 0.04 0.09 0.05






cons -0.02 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07
0.66 0.23 0.24 0.26
linear-logistic hazard function ht = 1/(1 + exp(−α− βt))
α -1.23 -1.05 -1.19 -1.16
β 0.21 0.16 0.20 0.21
likelihood ratio test H0 : β = 0
p−value 0.11 0.23 0.13 0.13
This is a summary of the estimation results for four dynamic panel models. The notations follow
Table 1. For each regressor, the first row reports the estimator of the corresponding coefficient,
and the second row is its associated p−value. The estimators of the hazard functions are derived
based on the run length of the residuals of the regressions.
33
Table 7: Benchmark Models with Nominal Variables
Regressors Model I Model II Model III Model IV
rp -0.85 -0.91 -0.83 -0.89
0.16 0.22 0.29 0.31
gdp 0.23 0.23 0.26 0.26
0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02
rr -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00






cons 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.23
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
linear-logistic hazard function ht = 1/(1 + exp(−α− βt))
α -0.02 -0.10 -0.10 0.01
β 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.01
likelihood ratio test H0 : β = 0
p−value 0.90 0.83 0.83 0.97
This is a summary of the estimation results for nominal variables. The notations follow Table 1.
For each regressor, the first row reports the estimator of the corresponding coefficient, and the
second row is its associated p−value. The estimators of the hazard functions are derived based
on the run length of the residuals of the regressions.
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Table 8: Benchmark Models with GDP Deflator
Regressors Model I Model II Model III Model IV
rp 0.14 0.14 -0.22 -0.19
0.75 0.77 0.69 0.74
gdp 0.16 0.16 -0.24 -0.23
0.18 0.18 0.33 0.35
rr -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01
0.26 0.66 0.18 0.18






cons 0.10 0.10 0.18 0.18
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
linear-logistic hazard function ht = 1/(1 + exp(−α− βt))
α -0.29 -0.29 -0.51 -0.41
β 0.14 0.14 0.23 0.17
likelihood ratio test H0 : β = 0
p−value 0.42 0.42 0.20 0.34
This is a summary of the estimation results for different data (GDP deflator). The notations
follow Table 1. For each regressor, the first row reports the estimator of the corresponding
coefficient, and the second row is its associated p−value. The estimators of the hazard functions
are derived based on the run length of the residuals of the regressions.
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Table 9: Estimation of Hazard Functions
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
Linear hazard function
α 0.36 0.38 0.37 0.38
β 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07
likelihood ratio test H0 : β = 0
p−value 0.14 0.16 0.12 0.14
Linear-logistic hazard function
α -0.55 -0.45 -0.51 -0.48
β 0.25 0.23 0.26 0.25
likelihood ratio test H0 : β = 0
p−value 0.14 0.17 0.13 0.14
This is a summary of the estimation results for the linear function of the hazard rates in the
benchmark models. In the first panel, the linear hazard function is employed in the estimation,
compared with the linear-logistic hazard function in the second panel.
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D Figures
Figure 1: Cities and Locations
Here are the locations of the thirty-five cities studied in our paper. They are Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin,
Hangzhou, Guangzhou, Nanjing, Fuzhou, Shenyang, Jinan, Haerbin, Shijiazhuang, Urumqi, Changchun,
Haikou, Hohhot, Wuhan, Taiyuan, Chongqing, Changsha, Zhengzhou, Yinchuan, Xining, Nanning,





















Average GDP (billion RMB) between 1999 and 2009 for the thirty-five cities.
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Figure 3: House Prices



























Average house prices (RMB per square meter) between 1999 and 2009 for the thirty-five cities.
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Figure 4: Monthly One-year Real Deposit Rates






















Real Deposit Rates (2001 Jan to 2010 Oct)
 
 
This figure shows the one-year real deposit rates (in percentage) which are computed by subtracting the
CPI from the one-year nominal deposit rates.
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Figure 5: Hazard Rates




















This figure shows the hazard rate and 90 percent confidence intervals for runs of unexpected returns in
the Chinese housing market. The stars denote the estimated hazard rates and the squares denote the
corresponding confidence intervals.
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